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The Netherlands 
 
Saskia Bonjour and Peter Scholten 
 
22.1 Introduction 
 
In the late 1990s, the Netherlands still enjoyed an international reputation as an open 
and pluralist country, where migrants were granted extensive rights and anti-immigrant 
politics were relatively insignificant. Today, the ‘multicultural’ model is rejected perhaps 
more fiercely in the Netherlands than anywhere else, and the Netherlands are amongst the 
most vocal proponents of restrictive migration policies in Europe.  In this chapter, we will 
discuss how the tumultuous developments of the last decade have affected migration trends, 
policies and debates in the Netherlands.  
 Already in the early 1990s, Dutch politicians had abandoned their famous 
‘ethnic minority’ policy  for a ‘migrant integration’ policy which emphasised socio-economic 
participation rather than cultural rights. In parallel, they strove to curtail immigration through 
a series of restrictive reforms of asylum and family migration policies, as well as by excluding 
irregular migrants from almost all public services. After the turn of the century however, 
Dutch public and political debate on immigration and integration took a radical turn as a result 
of the 9/11 attacks and – most importantly – the political success and murder of anti-
immigrant politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Mainstream political parties interpreted Fortuyn’s 
success as a consequence of their own failure to address the Dutch public’s concern over the 
migration issue,  and adopted a much harder line so as to regain their voters’ confidence. As a 
result of the success of Geert Wilders´ Freedom Party since 2006, anti-immigrant politics 
remain a significant factor in Dutch politics until today.   
This portrayal of Dutch migration and integration politics as radically restrictive 
should be qualified in two ways. First, although a number of highly significant policy changes 
have been implemented over the last decade, overall policy change has arguably been more 
modest than the intensity of political debates might suggest. Second, in spite of restrictive 
tendencies, yearly immigration rates have continued to rise. Both the limited policy change 
and the rise of immigration flows are partly related to developments at EU level: the accession 
of countries in Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the emerging European 
Asylum and Migration Policy on the other hand.  
 
22.2  Major Developments in Migration Policy 
 
The intense public and political debate about immigration over the last decades has 
resulted in restrictive policy reforms especially in the field of family migration. With regard to 
labour migration and asylum however, policy reforms have targeted efficiency and selectivity 
rather than closure. In all areas of migration policy, the impact of the European Union has 
increased substantially. 
 
22.2.1 A new policy arena: the European Union 
 
The Netherlands used to be among the most enthusiastic supporters of the 
development of a European asylum and migration policy. It lobbied actively for granting the 
European Union competence to develop Community Law in the field of asylum and migration 
through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Over the past decade, a body of EU laws on asylum 
and migration has been introduced and the EU court has started to develop its jurisprudence. 
This Europeanisation has limited the room for manoeuvre of Dutch policymakers in ways 
they had neither intended nor foreseen (Bonjour and Vink forthcoming).  
Through a series of EU court rulings, the Netherlands has been obliged for instance to 
lower its income requirement for family migrants, to stop returning asylum seekers to Greece, 
to lower the administrative costs of residence permits, and to exempt Turkish citizens from 
obligatory civic integration programs. Mostly although not exclusively on the right side of the 
political spectrum, politicians resent the reduction of national sovereignty over immigration 
and the obstacles posed to restrictive reforms.  
The Rutte I cabinet (2010-2012), composed of Conservative Liberals and Christian 
Democrats with minority support from the Freedom Party, stated in its coalition agreement 
that it would strive to renegotiate the Family Reunification Directive, the Long-Term 
Residence Directive, the Qualification Directive, the Return Directive, and the EU Turkey 
Association Agreement – in other words, most of the EU asylum and migration acquis. The 
current Rutte II coalition of Conservative Liberals and Social Democrats seems less 
ambitious, but it continues to lobby for restrictive reform of EU law especially on family 
migration.  
 
22.2.2 Family Migration Policies 
 
Since the early 2000s, family migration has come to be considered the most 
problematic type of migration, not only because it constituted the largest inflow but also 
because of the vulnerable socio-economic position of many family migrants. Moreover, 
family migration was considered a symptom of problematic cultural and religious differences 
between native Dutch and Muslim migrants. Debates focused on Turkish and Moroccan 
family migrants who made up 30 per cent of family migration in the early 2000s. In 2003, 75 
per cent of young people of Turkish and Moroccan background chose a partner from their 
country of origin (Hooghiemstra 2003). This was considered a symptom of failing integration 
into Dutch society.  
In 2004, the income requirement was raised from 100 per cent to 120 per cent of the 
minimum wage and the minimum age was raised from 18 to 21 years. As of 2006, family 
migrants from ‘non-Western’ countries were obliged to pass an exam about Dutch language 
and society before being granted entry.  In 2010, the level of this language exam was raised 
from A1 minus to A1 and a reading test was added. In the same year, the income requirement 
was lowered to 100 per cent of the minimum wage again as a result of the EU Court’s 
Chakroun ruling. 
There are a number of further restrictions  which the Dutch government has wanted to 
introduce for years, such as education requirements for family migrants and sponsors, a 
minimum age for spouses of 24 years, and an income requirement of 120 per cent. However, 
the EU Family Reunification Directive does not allow for these reforms.  
 
22.2.3 Asylum Policies 
 
As asylum inflows have decreased substantially since the early 2000s, asylum no 
longer dominates public and political debates. However, the Dutch government has continued 
its efforts to shorten and simplify asylum procedures. 
In 2000, the different types of residence permits for refugees and persons with 
subsidiary and temporary protection were abolished, so as to reduce the number of procedures 
aimed at getting a ‘better’ status. Since then, all asylum seekers whose application is accepted 
are granted the same temporary residence permit, which may be replaced by a permanent 
permit after five years. 
In 2010, the asylum procedure was modified substantially. Decisions on asylum 
applications must normally be taken within six months, extended in exceptional 
circumstances to one year. Since 1994, there was also a shortened procedure of four to six 
working days, in which ‘apparently unfounded’ cases were treated. Almost all applications 
were rejected in this shortened procedure. The new procedure introduced in 2010 stipulates 
that asylum seekers must be granted a ‘rest and preparation period’ of at least six days before 
the actual procedure starts. These preparations include a meeting with legal counsel, a medical 
examination, and document and identity checks. The ‘general asylum’ procedure which 
follows takes no more than eight working days, in which the first and second hearing must 
take place. Only complicated cases may be referred to the ‘extended procedure’ of six 
months.  In 2011, 56 per cent of cases were decided in the eight-day ‘general procedure’. Of 
these, 39 per cent of applicants were granted a residence permit. The Dutch Council for 
Refugees, the major refugee interest group, is largely positive about this new procedure.  
However, a very large group of asylum seekers who had applied many years ago under 
the old procedures were still in the Netherlands, often still awaiting a final decision on their 
application. In 2007, the centre-left Balkenende IV government implemented a ‘Pardon 
Regulation’ whereby all persons who had filed an asylum application before April 2001, had 
since stayed in the Netherlands and had not committed a crime, were eligible for 
regularisation. In total, 28,000 persons were regularised through this pardon.  
 
22.2.4 Labour Migration Policies 
 
The large majority of labour migrants in the Netherlands are EU citizens, migrating 
under EU law on the free movement of workers. Intra-EU labour migration used to be 
considered entirely unproblematic in the Netherlands, but recently this has changed. After the 
first wave of enlargement in 2004, the Netherlands made use of the opportunity to restrict new 
EU citizens’ access to the labour market. However, this restriction was lifted in 2007, even 
though it could have been maintained until 2011. In 2011, a Parliamentary Committee of 
Inquiry was installed to specifically study ‘recent labour migration’ and concluded that ‘the 
Netherlands has been unable to manage the inflow of labour migrants from Central and 
Eastern Europe’, expressing concern in particular at the housing situation and the number of 
mala fide employment agencies (TK 2011-2012 32680 Nr 4). Perhaps partly as a result of 
these concerns, restrictions on the labour market access of Bulgarians and Romanians will 
only be lifted at the latest possible date, that is in January 2014.  
With regard to labour migration from third countries, the Dutch government strives to 
develop speedy and simple admission procedures for foreigners who are expected to 
contribute to the Dutch economy. In 2004, the ‘Regulation Knowledge Migrants’ was 
introduced. It provides facilitated entry for migrants with high salaries,  which are currently at 
least €51,239 gross per year, or  €37,575 for those less than 30 years old. PhD candidates and 
medical specialists in training who earn at least the minimum wage can also qualify. 
Knowledge migrants’ family members are granted entry without further conditions. In 2011, 
5,047 persons were granted entry to the Netherlands as knowledge migrants, and a third of 
these were from India.  
Since 2006, the government has been working on a new labour migration policy. This 
‘modern migration policy’ was adopted by Parliament in 2010, and is scheduled to enter into 
force in June 2013.  Under the ‘modern migration policy’, companies and institutions are 
attributed increased responsibility for documentation and behaviour of their foreign 
employee(s), subject to administrative and financial penalties. After a solvability and 
reliability check, employers can be labelled as a ‘recognised sponsor’ by the Immigration 
Services. This status gives them access to facilitated procedures: all applications filed by 
‘recognised sponsors’ should be treated within two weeks.  
 
22.3 The Netherlands’ Immigrant Population and Migration Trends 
 
22.3.1 Immigrant population 
 
As Table 22.1 below shows,  whether the number of migrants living in the Netherlands 
is high or low depends – as numbers often do – on definitions.  The percentage of people of 
foreign nationality living in the Netherlands is relatively low, at 5 per cent. The part of the 
population born abroad is twice as large, at 11 per cent. The part of the population born 
abroad or with one or both parents born abroad is substantial, at 21per cent.  
  
 Table 22.1: Immigrant Population the Netherlands on 1 January 2012 
 
 Population As percentage of total 
population 
Total population 16,730,348 100% 
Foreign nationality 
of which EU citizens 
786,057 
360,847 
5% 
2% 
Foreign born 
of which born in EU 
1,772,204 
433,260 
11% 
3% 
Foreign born or parent(s) foreign born 
of which (parents) born in EU 
3,494,193 
946,621 
21% 
6% 
Source: Statistics Netherlands http://statline.cbs.nl (accessed: 11 March 2013)   
 
Definitions also matter in determining whether the migrant population is on the rise. 
The percentage of foreign nationals is stable at five per cent since 1995. However, the 
percentage of foreign born has risen from eight per cent in 1995 to the current 11 per cent, and 
the number of persons born abroad or with parent(s) born abroad has risen from 16 per cent in 
1995 to the current 21 per cent.   
Table 22.2 below lists the major groups of migrant backgrounds in the Netherlands.  
The five major groups, which each make up about 10 per cent of the total migrant background 
population, are of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Indonesian, and German origin. Germany 
is the largest neighbouring country, with which exchange and mobility has been high for 
centuries. The first Turkish and Moroccan migrants came to the Netherlands to work in the 
1960s and 1970s: their number has since grown through family migration. Surinamese and 
Indonesian migration to the Netherlands peaked around the independence of these former 
colonies, in the 1970s and 1950s respectively.  
Four other groups make up much smaller but still significant parts of the Dutch 
migrant population. The population from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba increased especially in 
the 1990s. These islands are still part of the Dutch Kingdom, be it with different statuses, and 
their citizens may enter and reside in the Netherlands freely. Belgium of course is the 
Netherlands’ other neighbouring country which accounts for significant migration flows. The 
population from former Yugoslavia has sought refuge from the wars in the 1990s and 2000s, 
although a small part came to the Netherlands as labour migrants already in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Polish population finally is a relatively new population, which has increased 
steeply since 2004.  
 
Table 2: Major Migrant Groups in the Netherlands on 1 January 2012 
 Total First generation: 
foreign born 
Second generation: 
parent(s) foreign born 
Total foreign 
background population 
3,494,193 1,772,204 1,721,989 
Turkey 392,923 197,107 195,816 
Indonesia 377,618 114,558 263,060 
Germany 376,606 108,290 268,316 
Morocco 362,954 168,214 194,740 
Surinam 346,797 183,752 163,045 
(former) Dutch Antilles 
and Aruba 
143,992 82,693 61,299 
Belgium 114,022 38,876 75,146 
Poland 100,775 77,642 23,133 
Former Yugoslavia 80,837 52,552 28,285 
 Source: Statistics Netherlands http://statline.cbs.nl (accessed: 11 March 2013)   
 
22.3.2 Immigration Trends 
 
Figure 22.1 below shows that immigration rates to the Netherlands have risen steadily 
since 1995, interrupted by a short decrease in the early 2000s, but increasing again after 2005.  
 
 Source: Statistics Netherlands http://statline.cbs.nl (accessed: 11 March 2013)   
 
This fluctuation is related to major changes in the different migration channels since 
the mid-1990s, shown in Figure 22.2 below. In 1995, family migration was the major 
migration channel, with asylum inflow just below that.  The drop in overall immigration rates 
shown in Figure 22.1 above is explained by the sharp drop in asylum inflow after 2001, as 
well as by the less dramatic decrease of family migration after 2003.  The rise in overall 
immigration rates after 2005 is explained in small part by the modest rise of family migration 
after 2007, but most of all by the steep increase in labour migration after 2007. Today, labour 
migration is the largest migration flow to the Netherlands, followed by family migration. The 
number of foreign students has risen steadily, especially from China and Germany. While in 
1995, asylum was a major migration channel and student migration almost insignificant, in 
2011 foreign students outnumbered asylum seekers three to one.  
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Figure 22.1: Immigration of Foreign Nationals
 Source: Statistics Netherlands http://statline.cbs.nl (accessed: 11 March 2013)   
 
The decrease of family migration from 2004 until 2008 is most probably related to the 
raise of the age and income requirements for family migrants in 2004. Evaluations have 
shown that especially family migration from Morocco, Turkey, and Surinam dropped sharply 
immediately after these reforms. Since 2008, Moroccan and Turkish family migration has 
picked up slowly. The rise of family migration since 2008 is mostly due however to the 
families of workers from Central and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, coming to the 
Netherlands.  
The sharp decrease in asylum inflow to the Netherlands since 2001 is mostly related to 
global developments, such as the reduction of refugee flows from former Yugoslavia, the 
former USSR, Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2007, refugee flows from Iraq and Somalia have 
increased again, but numbers remain relatively low. At least in part, the decrease may also be 
related to the reforms of the asylum procedure implemented in 2000: the shortening of asylum 
procedures and the reduction of appeal possibilities may have discouraged asylum seekers 
from coming to the Netherlands.  
The sharp increase in labour migration flows is due mostly to rising flows from other 
EU countries. The percentage of EU nationals among labour migrants has risen from 65 per 
cent in 1995 to 80 per cent in 2011. Most of these new EU labour migrants come from Central 
and Eastern Europe, especially from Poland: in 2011, 27  per cent of all labour migrants were 
Polish. Labour migration from Southern European countries has also increased, probably as a 
result of the economic crisis. Labour migration from Italy, Spain, and Greece has more than 
doubled since 2008. The number of labour migrants from each of these countries remained 
below 2,000 in 2011, however, whereas the number of Polish labour migrants was 13,000. 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
Figure 22.2: Immigration of Foreign Nationals per Migration Channel
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Labour migration from Asia, especially India and China, has also increased sharply: about 
1,500 Chinese and 2,000 Indian labour migrants came to the Netherlands in 2011. Most 
Indian migrants come as ‘knowledge migrants’ .1 
Figure 22.3 below shows the fluctuation of the yearly migration rates of the five 
groups with the highest immigration numbers since 1995. Until the early 2000s, Germans, 
British, Moroccan and Turkish nationals were the major immigrating groups. As of 2004, the 
immigration of Moroccans decreased sharply, while Turkish immigration decreased at a 
somewhat slower rate. As of 2008, Turkish and Moroccan immigration has started to rise 
again, but it is still far from the levels of the early 2000s. UK immigration has decreased 
slightly, while German immigration has increased. The most spectacular change however is 
the increase of Polish immigration. From 1995 until 2002, the yearly immigration of Poles 
was between one and two-thousand. Since the Polish accession to the EU in 2004, the number 
of Poles immigrating each year has risen steadily to  reach almost 19,000 in 2011. This steep 
increase in Polish immigration is the most significant development in recent migration trends 
to the Netherlands.  
 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands http://statline.cbs.nl (accessed: 11 March 2013)   
 
Finally, a short word on the ‘uncountable’:  Van der Leun and Illies (2009) have 
estimated that the number of irregular migrants in the Netherlands was almost 90,000 between 
                                                          
1
 see Jennissen 2012 for a detailed discussion of background and trends in different immigration types until 
2009. 
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Figure 22.3: Immigration of Major Foreign National Groups
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2000 and 2005. Most irregular migrants either overstay their visa, or fail to depart after being 
denied asylum.  
 
22.4 Immigrant Rights and their Participation in Public Life 
 
22.4.1 Migrant Integration Policies, Rights and Citizenship 
 
Access to rights and citizenship for newcomers is regulated by the Civic Integration 
Act as part of Dutch civic integration policies (‘inburgeringsbeleid’). Permanent residency is 
granted only after immigrants have passed a (post-entry) civic integration test. Since 1998 
there had already been an obligation to participate in civic integration courses, but the new act 
passed in 2006 stipulates that newcomers are obliged to pass this test. The civic integration 
test consists of a practical part (proving language proficiency and familiarity with Dutch 
society in real-life situations), and a theoretical part (proving basic knowledge of Dutch 
society and A2-level proficiency in Dutch). Since 2012, newcomers have to finance their 
participation in civic integration courses and select course providers themselves.  Besides 
newcomers or newly arriving migrants applying for a permanent residence status, settled 
migrants (even with citizenship) can also be asked to take part in civic integration courses in 
case of dependency on welfare state benefits. Since 2010, passing this post-entry test is also a 
requirement for naturalization. 
An evaluation in 2010 revealed that almost all participants were eventually able to 
pass the test, and 80 per cent of the participants even managed to pass the test on their first 
try. However, little is known of the more enduring effects on the participation or integration 
of those who have passed the post-entry (and in some cases also the pre-entry) integration 
tests. A recent evaluation revealed that almost half of the participants in the civic integration 
programs oriented towards employment did find a job within a reasonable period, but often 
also lost the job soon thereafter, possibly due to the economic crisis. 
The Linking Act, passed in 1998, connects residency status and access to social rights 
and citizenship. It links the computer systems of the populations register, social service 
systems and the immigration office. Whereas some rights are granted to migrants with a 
temporary residency status as well, migrants with a permanent residency status have access to 
almost all social and political rights. Migrants who have lived in the Netherlands for at least 
five years can also vote in local elections or be elected to office for a local town council. The 
current government coalition (Rutte II) has announced plans to extend this period from five to 
seven years. Active and passive political rights on the regional and national level are restricted 
to Dutch citizens only.  
Naturalisation is seen as the end-result of successful integration. Apart from special 
regulations for persons of Dutch ancestry (where a form of ius sanguinis applies) or 
inhabitants of the Dutch Kingdom (the former Dutch Antilles), Dutch citizenship can only be 
acquired if the applicant has a permanent resident status, has stayed in the Netherlands for at 
least five years without interruption (does not apply to family migrants) and has successfully 
completed the (post-entry) civic integration test. Formally, dual citizenship is not permitted 
(since 1997) and the applicant has to renounce the original citizenship; in practice, many 
exceptions apply, such as in cases of family migration and in cases where the country of 
origin does not allow for renouncing ones citizenship. However, the number of naturalisations 
has decreased sharply since the end of the 1990s; partly this is due to stricter rules but partly 
also to the disproportionally high numbers of naturalisation at the end of the 1990s by 
migrants who had already been in the Netherlands for a longer period. Since 2006, a 
naturalisation ceremony is held to mark the status of the occasion. Since 2009, a declaration 
of solidarity is included as part of this ceremony to further mark the allegiance to Dutch 
society that is associated with citizenship.  
 
22.4.2 Migrant Participation in Public Life 
 
Data on participation of migrants in Dutch society is available for the first as well as 
the second generation of migrants, and allows for a distinction between different migrant 
groups as well (such as Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese and Antilleans). Recent data shows 
that the labour participation of immigrants has been hit particularly hard by the economic 
crisis in the Netherlands (CBS 2012). The decrease of labour participation at times of 
economic slowdown was higher for non-western migrants than for the native population. The 
labour participation of Moroccans and Turks (about 50 per cent in2012) has been particularly 
low when compared to the native population (about 70 per cent). Whereas preceding the 
crisis, unemployment amongst non-western migrants had decreased from over 22 per cent in 
1996 to less than 10 per cent in 2007 and 2008, it has increased to over 15 per cent in early 
2012 (compared to over four per cent amongst the native population). Unemployment levels 
of Moroccans were especially worrying as they reached about 20 per cent in 2012. One of the 
explanations for the weak situation of migrants in the Dutch labour market is their 
involvement in flexible work relations, as they often work  with temporary contracts.  
In terms of income and welfare, the position of migrants remains considerably weaker 
than of the native population. Not only do especially non-western migrants live on relatively 
low income levels, their dependency on welfare state benefits is also relatively high. This 
applies in particular to the first generation of non-western migrants; the situation for the 
second generation has improved considerably. In 2011, no less than 12 per cent of non-
western migrants was dependent on some form of welfare state benefits, compared to less 
than two per cent for the native population. Welfare dependency has increased (also when 
compared to the native population) since the economic crisis began in 2008. Income levels of 
western migrants, like Polish migrants, are more comparable to the native population, though 
also somewhat lower.  
 In terms of housing, there is a persistent concentration of migrant groups in the 
large urban regions of the Netherlands, particularly Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, 
Utrecht and Eindhoven. Also within these cities, studies have shown that concentrations of 
migrants in specific boroughs persist and even increased at the end of the 2000s. About 50 
Dutch city boroughs now have a population that consists for more than 50 per cent of non-
western migrants. This is argued to be due to the emigration out of these boroughs of not only 
native families, but also relatively successful migrant families. A recent trend is that new 
western migrant groups, like the labour migrants from CEE countries, are also settling 
primarily in those boroughs with large non-western immigrant populations.  
Education is often considered the key sector for migrant incorporation. Although non-
western migrants are still behind their native peers in terms of educational achievements, 
there is clear evidence that the gap between migrants and natives in the educational sphere is 
decreasing. The gap still consists of higher drop-out rates, less representation in middle- and 
higher-educational levels and higher study delays. Also, data suggest a clear relationship 
between the language that children speak at home and their scores in language proficiency in 
primary education, explaining part of the lower scores of non-western migrants. However, the 
educational achievements of some groups, like Antilleans and some refugee groups (like 
Iranians), are almost similar to the native population. Also, especially second generation 
Moroccans and Turks are rapidly making up the difference with the native population as well. 
The (relative) progress of migrants in the educational sphere was reason for a recent 
parliamentary investigative committee on integration policy to conclude that the integration 
process in the Netherlands was advancing relatively well (TK 2003-2004, 28689, nr. 8-9: 
520).  
The Dutch Statistics Office also collects data on social-cultural orientation and on 
delinquency amongst migrants. This reveals clear differences between different migrant 
groups. The Antilleans and Surinamese are strongly oriented towards Dutch society, they 
identify themselves with the Netherlands and often speak Dutch at home as well. More than 
two-thirds of Moroccans and Turks identify primarily with their own (ethnic) community, and 
especially Turks have low rates of Dutch language proficiency. Most non-western migrants 
also show very little interest in Dutch politics, though an exception has to be made for high-
education refugee groups like Iranians. However, identification with Dutch society has 
increased amongst second generation Moroccans and Turks. Also, research has indicated that 
most migrants, including Moroccans and Turks, tend to identify strongly with the city they 
live in (Entzinger 2009). In terms of delinquency, the percentage of individuals that has ever 
been suspect of police investigation is three to four times higher for specific migrants when 
compared to natives. This applies to Antilleans (5.9 per cent), Moroccans (5.2 per cent), and 
Somalis (4.6 per cent) in particular (compared to about one per cent for the native population). 
Moreover, for Moroccans and Turks, the suspect rates are higher amongst the second 
generation than the first generation. Suspect rates amongst new western migrants from CEE 
countries are relatively low when compared to other migrant groups, and are at about 1,5 per 
cent.  
These data clearly show how vulnerable the state of migrant integration is in the 
Netherlands. There are some positive signs such as a gradual increase of educational 
achievements of migrants and a decrease in unemployment levels since the 1990s, as well as 
negative signs such as welfare state dependency, spatial concentration, persistent social-
cultural cleavages and high delinquency rates. The Dutch case also clearly shows that the 
economic crisis is affecting migrants particularly hard, and has erased much of the progress 
that was made in terms of labour market participation in the years before the crisis. 
Furthermore, some studies (Entzinger 2009) have argued that the sharp tone of the public and 
media debate on migrant integration since the early 2000s has negatively affected mutual 
perceptions of migrants and natives. This has contributed to an ‘integration paradox’ where in 
spite of modest progress on some objective indicators of integration, the subjective perception 
of the state of integration has deteriorated.  
 
  
22.5  Public and Media Discourses about Migration 
 
Discourses on migration and integration in Dutch politics and media have changed 
considerably since the early 2000s. In 2000, a broad national minorities debate was triggered 
by a media article on ‘The Multicultural Tragedy’ by the public intellectual Paul Scheffer.  
However, the tone of the debate intensified significantly in what has become known as ‘the 
long year of 2002’ in Dutch politics, when the populist politician Pim Fortuyn made 
immigrant integration the centre of public and political attention. Fortuyn called for ‘zero-
immigration’ as the Netherlands was ‘full’, he called for a ‘cold war against Islam’ and 
dismissed Islam as ‘a backward culture’.  International events such as the attacks on 11 
September  2001 further contributed to growing concerns regarding Islam and immigration. 
When running for the 2002 parliamentary elections, Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal-
rights activist on the same day that polls indicated that his party would come out first in the 
elections. However, his party was briefly involved in a government coalition that was formed 
in 2003, and his political agenda has changed the political landscape on migration and 
integration ever since. Although the Fortuyn Party eventually fell into decline, populism and 
anti-immigrant political parties have remained a presence in Dutch politics ever since. In the 
period 2010-2011, the support of the anti-immigrant Freedom Party, led by Geert Wilders, 
was even essential to create a coalition government which was led by Prime Minister Rutte.  
Before the events of the early 2000s, the Dutch case had often been perceived in terms 
of an alleged national multicultural model. Indeed, in the 1980s an Ethnic Minorities Policy 
was pursued that revealed some characteristics of multiculturalism. However, already by the 
early 1990s this multiculturalist model had been discarded for a more liberal-egalitarianist 
model that was oriented primarily at socio-economic participation. In fact, in the early 1990s 
the Dutch experienced their first national minorities debate, in which Islam and the desire to 
revaluate Dutch culture and history in the face of on-going immigration already played a key 
role. This debate provided a clear precursor for the events in the early 2000s. Since then, a 
counter discourse developed in which multiculturalism was associated with political 
correctness, taboos and being ‘too soft’ on migrants.  
Critics of multiculturalism argue that under the banner of multiculturalism the ‘voice 
from the street’ was ignored. As such, immigrant integration became a powerful issue for 
populist politicians to be used against the established political elite; it came to symbolize the 
technocratic and elitist character of the Dutch consensual type of policymaking. In response to 
the sharp rise of support for these populist parties in national elections since 2002, the 
government’s immigrant integration policies clearly became more responsive to public 
opinion on immigration integration. The Verweij-Jonker Institute (2004: 201) refers to this as 
an emerging ‘articulation logic’ in Dutch politics, meaning that politicians strive to articulate 
the problems and feelings of society and ensure that the ‘voice from the street’ is taken 
seriously. Prins describes this in terms of ‘hyperrealism’, ‘in which the courage of speaking 
freely about specific problems and solutions became simply the courage to speak freely in 
itself’ (Prins 2002: 252). Also, hyperrealism would have replaced the old ‘political 
correctness’ with a new political correctness that prohibits ‘saying something positive about 
the integration of immigrants, which would be naïve and would mean ignoring the problems’.  
The Dutch communication scholar Vliegenthart has shown that, already in the 1990s, 
there were at least several competing discourses on migrant integration in the Netherlands 
(Vliegenthart 2007). Multiculturalism was then already just one of several discourses, such as 
a discourse on the emancipation of migrants (in particular migrant women), one on the need 
for restriction of migration, one that defined migrants as victims and one that focused 
primarily on Islam as a threat to Dutch society. It is remarkable that in the media, the ‘Islam 
as a threat’ frame of mind became en vogue much earlier than in parliamentary debate. Also it 
is notable that the multiculturalist frame nowadays seems to be used more frequently in 
parliamentary discussions, rather than in media debates as it was  about a decade ago. It 
appears that the multicultural ‘model’ of integration is becoming more important as a counter-
discourse against which new policy developments are to be juxtaposed. 
The changes in discourses on integration and those on immigration are strongly 
related. In the 1990s, the relation between migration and integration was framed in terms of 
limiting immigration to allow for the effective integration of present migrants. In the early 
2000s, this relation was reframed in a way that positioned integration measures such as the 
pre- and post-entry integration tests as tools to limit immigration, especially of particular 
groups of family migrants. In public and political discourses, strong issue connections were 
made between immigration regulation and concerns about gender and security. Gender played 
an especially central role in public discourses on family migration from countries like 
Morocco and Turkey. For instance, the plans for the new Civic Integration and Civic 
Integration Abroad Acts, as well as restrictive family migration policy reforms, were 
defended with arguments related to the emancipation of migrant women, referring explicitly 
to issues like arranged marriages, honour-killings and illiteracy (Bonjour and De Hart 2013). 
Gender also provided a key argument for making the pre- and post-entry tests mandatory, to 
make sure that vulnerable women would be reached as well. There was also a strong issue 
connection with security and radicalisation especially in media and political discourses. 
However, in policy documents this issue connection has remained weak.    
The sharp tone of the national debate on migration and integration has to be 
distinguished from the local dimension of these debates (Scholten 2012). Whereas in some 
cities, most notably Rotterdam, a similar assimilationist turn in public discourse can be 
discerned, in many other cities’ policy as well as media discourses have remained more 
pragmatic and sometimes even positive in relation to diversity. Some city administrations 
have even expressed resentment of national policy discourses negatively affecting local inter-
ethnic relations, which undermines local efforts to promote inter-ethnic relations. Amsterdam 
is one of the cities that, even in the context of the national developments of the 2000s, has 
maintained a more positive tone toward diversity and has attempted to shape a local identity 
that embraces diversity (‘We are all Amsterdammers’).  
Since about 2011-2012, the Dutch debate on migration and integration seems to have 
entered a new stage. On the one hand, controversy over integration and Islam in particular 
seems to have gradually faded off the political and media agendas. Rather than defining 
migrant integration as a specific policy issue in itself, it is increasingly mainstreamed as a 
generic issue that relates to policy sectors such as education, housing and labour. Government 
also formally announced that it would no longer to use terminology that differentiates 
between citizens of migrant or native descent (a much used but difficult to translate concept 
was ‘allochtonen’, which basically meant ‘those not from here’). Some argue that this 
‘mainstreaming’ of migrant integration is in fact a signal of government withdrawal from this 
issue domain.  
On the other hand, public and media discourses are increasingly picking up on (mostly 
labour) migration from CEE countries in particular (as a reflection of the increase of CEE 
migration, see Figures 22.2 and 22.3). Especially in the larger cities, concerns about housing, 
labour and education for CEE migrants has increased considerably. However, the means for 
addressing these concerns are very limited, largely because CEE migrants are EU citizens and 
cannot be obliged to take part in civic integration programs. The mayors from Rotterdam and 
The Hague have especially become prominent advocates in media and politics of a more 
integration-oriented approach for CEE migrants; they also attempted to put this on the EU 
agenda with the help of the Dutch national government. In the meantime, problems related to 
CEE migration seem to be catching more and more media and political attention, including 
exploitation of CEE migrants in the housing market, the construction of ‘Polish hotels’, 
alcohol and crime issues and unsuccessful efforts to get Dutch unemployed to take jobs in the 
horticultural sector where many CEE migrants work.  Perhaps most notoriously, in 2012, 
Wilders’ Freedom Party stirred controversy with the launch of a website that would field 
complaints for problems related to Polish migrants. An important issue connection is 
emerging between concerns about CEE migration and the growing Euroscepticism in the 
Netherlands.  
 
22.6 Conclusion 
The Netherlands only partially lives up to its new international reputation of an 
assimilationist, anti-immigrant country. Over the last decade, debates about migration and 
integration have intensified in the Netherlands, and ‘multiculturalism’ has come to be rejected 
perhaps more vehemently than anywhere else. However, restrictive policy reform has been 
more moderate than these debates might suggest. Civic integration policies and family 
migration policies have been substantially tightened, but EU law and jurisprudence have taken 
some of the sharpest edges off these reforms. In the fields of labour migration and asylum, 
policy reforms have targeted efficiency and selectivity rather than closure.  Migrant 
integration and participation in Dutch society remains precarious, although improvements can 
be observed mainly in education. Immigration flows have increased rather than decreased, 
mostly as a result of new intra-EU migration from Central and Eastern Europe.  
 Today, cultural difference and fear of Islam no longer dominate Dutch public 
and political agendas.  The migration debate in the Netherlands has a new focus: the 
immigration and incorporation of labour migrants and their families from Central and Eastern 
Europe, particularly Poland.  In these debates, the increasing impact of the European Union 
on Dutch migration politics is felt more sharply than ever.  
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